Yet Israeli friends have told me that they were surprised by the British Parliament’s
vote against military action on Syria. They fear it showed that even Israel’s closest
I can understand why Israelis have come to this conclusion. But I believe firmly that
this conclusion is wrong. Israel is not alone, and the British Parliament’s vote on
Iran is a very different issue from Syria. We are clear that a nuclear armed Iran
would jump start a regional nuclear arms race that would threaten not only Israel but
the world. That is why we have led the world with some of the most stringent
financial sanctions on Iran. It is why we have placed such a high value on our
Parliamentary democracy for weakness. We have made clear that while we welcome
the positive tone from Iran’s President Rouhani we remain clear eyed about the need
to see real action from Iran on its nuclear programme. President Rouhani should
programme is as strong as ever. And all should know that our commitment to Israel’s
Diplomats and policy makers sometimes talk glibly about security, as if it were just a
heading for policy papers. I know that for every Israeli, it is very real. It is the
difference between having confidence in the future and not, between life and death.
Iran’s programme goes far beyond the requirements of a civilian nuclear program
me.
Since 2012 Iran has installed thousands more centrifuges, including the more
advanced IR2M centrifuges. The regime has expanded its stockpile of 20% enriched
uranium and has continued work on the Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak.
No one can be in doubt how seriously we take the threat of a nuclear armed Iran. We
and our allies imposed one of the most far-reaching sanctions regimes ever adopted,
which has had a huge impact on the Iranian economy.
Eleven years ago, I was living in Iran, as Britain’s Deputy Ambassador. I dealt daily
with the Iranian regime. One of the key lessons from my time there is that the
Iranian regime knows its economy is a huge vulnerability. It is inefficient, corrupt,
badly managed and has tens of millions of people directly or indirectly on the
government payroll. Without the regime’s oil income, it’s in trouble.
That’s why the sanctions are working. The rial has collapsed in value.
Unemployment is high. Inflation is rampant. The official inflation rate of 28% is an
illusion; the true figure is double that. The cost of doing business with Iran has gone
up dramatically. Iran’s ability to sell its own oil has been curtailed by international
sanctions that make it almost impossible to conduct financial transactions with Iran.
Iran is not getting the technology it needs to sustain its own oil production, and
production is down 45%, costing the Iranian exchequer over $40 billion a year. The
reserves of the Iranian regime are shrinking fast.
This explains the change in the Iranian tone - why have we witnessed such a marked
change in their rhetoric. Because the government is under unprecedented pressure
due to the sanctions
The Iranian Government also know that there is a simple way to bring sanctions to
an end. By giving the international community the confidence it needs that Iran is
not developing and will not develop a nuclear weapon.
Opportunity
Diplomatic success often follows a readiness to use hard power. The reason that Iran
is now at the negotiating table is because we have imposed and maintained some of
the toughest sanctions in modern times. And last week in Geneva we saw a new tone
in the negotiations - for the first time an apparent willingness to negotiate rather
than simply to talk.
But I understand the scepticism in Israel – and not just in Israel – about the ne
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positive tone from Iran. After all, the centrifuges are still spinning. To succeed,
conciliatory words will have to be matched by the right actions, and they will need to
be transparent and verifiable. After all, it is the Iranian government's choices alone
that have led to the comprehensive sanctions that are currently in place, and it is
those choices that need to change if the sanctions are to be lifted.
So I want to be absolutely clear: while the centrifuges are spinning, while inspectors
are denied full and free access to nuclear sites, while there is any sense that Iran is
prevaricating or reneging on any commitments, we will continue to maintain strong
sanctions. As William Hague has made clear, while we welcome the positive tone
and do not want to waste a possible opportunity, a substantial change in British or
Western policies on the Iranian nuclear programme requires a substantive change in
that programme.
We need to be crystal clear as we go into this negotiation.
We are not naive. We have ample experience of dealing with the Iranian regime and
go into this with our eyes open.
As we take part in these negotiations we will keep clear in our minds one thing above
all others – the infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear programme, how many centrifuges
they have, and how long it would take them to develop a bomb.
We will neither rush nor tarry. Iran’s nuclear programme marches on, and as more
centrifuges get installed so it becomes harder to negotiate a solution that gives us all
sufficient reassurance. The clock is ticking.
But the clock is not at zero. And it is far from clear than time is working against us.
The leaders of Iran are watching their economy crumble, their unemployment grow,
their factories shut, their reserves shrink. They know that if these talks do not go
somewhere in a sensible timeframe we will be bringing in the next, even tougher
round of sanctions.
We are all in favour of resolving this issue through negotiations rather than through
military means. The question is whether such a negotiated outcome is possible –
whether the rulers of Iran are willing to make take the concrete, verifiable steps
needed for us to have confidence that they cannot develop nuclear weapons quickly.
We hope that negotiations will lead to concrete results, and it is important that we
maintain the positive momentum. But we should not forget that Iran’s nuclear
programme is continuing to develop.
Given our preference for a negotiated outcome, we should test whether this
possibility exists. We have an opportunity, but we must not take the smiles at face
value, but neither should we rule out in advance the possibility that negotiations
might succeed. Instead we should test whether the same motivation that makes
them smile might also cause them to make meaningful steps on their nuclear
programme.
I do not want to pre-empt the negotiations by saying exactly what those steps should
be. But by the nature of it being negotiation and not a surrender, it will involve a
serious discussion about whether Iran will give the international community what we
need to have sufficient confidence. And that means Israel having sufficient
confidence too.
Conclusion
As a friends of Israel, we understand and respect Israel’s concerns. We are neither
naïve about Iran, nor blind to the risks. And we do not underestimate the difficulties
ahead.
The shadow of a nuclear Iran has stood over the people of Israel for too long. Right
now, we have an opportunity to test whether that shadow can be removed peacefully.
We will not be naïve, we will not do a bad deal, we will neither rush nor allow Iran to
play for time. Where the negotiations go, I do not know. But I do know that Israel
does not face the threat from Iran alone.